5 Classic Muscle Cars That Make The Pontiac GTO Look Slow






If you were to say the term American muscle car, a Pontiac GTO will certainly spring to a lot of people’s minds, and for good reason. Originally a trim level of the 1964 Pontiac Tempest, the GTO nameplate, which stands for Gran Turismo Omologato (Grand Touring Homologation in Italian) became synonymous with big power in a modest package. Arguably, it started the whole muscle car trend, debuting before giants like the Mustang, Charger, and more. It had the muscle to back it up as well, with later examples boasting either a 400 or 455 cubic inch engine in top trim, with various options such as the famous Ram Air intake, characterized by its hood scoop.

Power figures are impressive for the time, boasting 360 hp and 500 lb-ft torque with the 455 big block, or 370 hp and 445 lb-ft torque with the Ram Air 400 in 1970. But how fast was it, really, in comparison to its peers? It’s hard to say in pure mathematical terms because of the variables; different magazines and journals list varying times, ranging from 14.6 at 99.6 mph to 13.6 at 104.5 mph with the 400 Ram Air and manual, the fastest configuration. The 455 was slower still, dropping down to 15 seconds.

Quite a few cars could certainly hang with the GTO, and more still could exceed it. For this article, we’ll take a look at the original GTO’s fastest year of 1970 and measure it against all muscle cars built up to that point, so nothing post-1970, and no special models like the Super Stock Hursts or Yenkos — these are common production cars only. Let’s kick it off.

1970 Dodge Challenger R/T 440 Six Pack: 13.6 @ 105 mph

Our opening car already matches the GTO’s best recorded time, and beats the 455 by over a second at the line, a massive length in drag racing terms: 1970 was the debut year of the Dodge Challenger. Made famous by its starring role in the hit movie “Vanishing Point,” the 1970 Dodge Challenger, in this case a 400 Six Pack-equipped R/T trim, is one of the most iconic muscle cars ever made, though its status is somewhat deceptive; Challengers are actually pony cars. 

Pony cars are smaller vehicles, in this case built on the Chrysler E-body, a crucial point when talking about power/weight ratio. This 1970 Dodge Challenger R/T houses the same engine as the midsize and full-size muscle cars, but the ’69 Charger R/T 440 weighing 3,900 pounds, whereas the ’70 Challenger comes in at 3,395 pounds. With less weight and a smaller profile to move through the air, the Challenger will naturally be the faster of the two body styles, and certainly as fast or faster than the GTO.

The 440 Six Pack does all the heavy lifting here, of course, boasting 375 hp and 480 lb-ft torque. Much like the 455, these were large, powerful engines designed for cruising; Winnebago motorhomes used these engines, for example, albeit with different accessories and tunes. When you take that engine, give it three carbs and some performance upgrades, and shove it into a car the size of a Challenger, it’s no wonder they exceed the GTO’s figures.

1970 Ford Mustang BOSS 429: 13.6 @ 114 mph

Here’s another car with a bit of a spotty drag racing record; Motor Trend actually tested their own ’69 Boss 429 and got a blistering 12.3-second quarter mile time at 112 mph. For these purposes, let’s use the worst-case scenario — a 1970 model year, same engine, running a 13.6 at 114. And that shouldn’t be all too surprising, because here we have an example of another smaller car with a massive engine shoved under the hood.

Originally, the Mustang didn’t even have a big block at all; the Mustang is one of the progenitors of the term pony car — smaller, more nimble cars with small block V8s like the 289 Ford or 350 Chevy in the Camaro. That changed in 1967, when Ford introduced the 390 option for the Mustang. The company continuously experimented with the design over the next couple of years, and while the 1970 car shares the same basic architecture as the original, their bodies are very different — as are their engines.

The 429 cubic-inch big block is, ostensibly, a racing engine. In fact, the Boss 429 itself was designed to compete in NASCAR. A little-known fact is that the 429 actually uses a hemispherical combustion chamber, like the legendary 426 HEMI engine from Mopar; this configuration allows for extremely efficient combustion processes, especially at rev ranges expected in racing, making this engine particularly well-suited to high-speed runs. It’s believed that Ford underrated the engine at 375 hp and 450 lb-ft torque, which — coupled with the Mustang’s slim profile — made for an extremely potent muscle car.

1970 Buick GS / GSX Stage 1: 13.38 @ 105.5 mph

With 360 hp and a whopping 510 lb-ft torque, the 1970 Buick GS Stage 1 rips up a quarter-mile track at 13.38 seconds, according to Motor Trend’s January 1970 issue. This one’s a bit conflated, however; the same car was also tested over at Hot Rod Magazine in November 1969, reaching the finish line after 14.40 seconds at 96 mph, albeit with the automatic. Being that the manual is faster for both the GTO and GS Stage 1, we’ll use those times instead for consistency.

Most people probably don’t say Buick and high-performance in the same breath anymore, but that wasn’t true in 1970. In fact, the GS Stage 1 was one of the fastest muscle cars on the market — and much like the previous entry, the GS and GSX special-edition were midsize, built on the same A-body platform as the GTO, Chevelle, Olds 4-4-2, and so on. The fastest Olds 4-4-2, a 1966 model with the W-30 and manual accomplished a 13.8-second time, making it about on-par with the GTO. This makes the Buick GS the second-fastest GM-platform in the quarter-mile run.

The engine used by the GS Stage 1 was the 455 cubic inch (7.4-liter) big block, among the most powerful Buick engines ever produced, and it was also Buick’s biggest ever V8 fitted to a production car. While it doesn’t have the same power rating as some others on this list, that engine more than makes up for it in raw torque, especially with the close-ratio Muncie 4-speed it was often paired with.

1970 Chevrolet Chevelle SS 454: 13.12 @ 107.01 mph

Arguably the first true mid-size car on this list, the 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle SS 454 is yet another iconic muscle car, wearing its classic Le Mans racing stripes and SS badging. Moreover, the LS6 engine option code bumped up power to 450 horsepower and 500 lb-ft torque, more power than anything else on this list, at least in terms of factory ratings. This produced rapid times frequently teasing the low-13 second mark, with Hot Rod attaining a respectable 13.44 @ 108.17 mph in their best run, for instance.

The 1970 Chevelle SS came in several different variants, each with their own power and top speed figures, ranging from the entry-level L34-code 396 ci unit with 350 hp, up to the infamous LS6. LS6-powered Chevelles are sometimes referred to today as the king of muscle cars, directly competing with the likes of the infamous 426 HEMI, the 428 Cobra Jet, and more. Much like the 429, the LS6 was a bespoke high-performance engine, sporting an 11.25:1 compression ratio, aggressive solid-lifter camshaft, aluminum pistons, and more, topped off with a thirsty 800 cfm (cubic feet per minute) Holley carburetor. All that runs through a Muncie M-22 Rock Crusher transmission.

In short, the LS6-powered Chevelle is the 1970 equivalent of a supercar today, though it’s decidedly less refined than one. According to Motor Trend, the transmission is noisy and unrefined, the engine unhappy on unleaded gasoline due to its high compression ratio, and it’s almost impossible to drive hard without spinning tires if you’re running regular street rubber. It’s decidedly specialized for one purpose — going fast, and it does that very well, indeed.

1970 Plymouth Barracuda 426 Hemi: 13.10 @ 107.1 mph

It should come as no surprise that the top spot is secured by a Hemi, an engine that needs no introduction to drag racing enthusiasts. In truth, the infamous Elephant Block could likely accommodate several spots on this list, but the fastest among them, at least according to Car Craft magazine, is the 1970 Plymouth Hemi ‘Cuda. Much like Ford’s 429, the 426 Street Hemi is widely rumored to have a significantly underreported horsepower rating throughout its production run — an impressive 425 hp and 490 lb/ft torque, so says Chrysler.

This was a massive, racing-oriented engine that just barely fit in a lot of these cars; getting hemi heads on the block required a lot of real-estate, one reason why you don’t see them too often. The option itself cost an eye-watering $900, or over $7,500 today — basically you have to buy a third of the car over again at the dealership. But what you get is, for all intents and purposes, the closest thing to a factory-built racecar without crossing the line into specialist vehicles. The A-body Barracuda was built with this in mind, being an early example of a hero sports car alongside its sister Dodge Challenger.

To put it into perspective, the already (supposedly) underrated 426 Hemi can launch the infamous Hurst Hemi ’68 Barracuda deep into 10-second times at over 120 mph. That same engine, albeit tuned for street use, propels the 1970 Hemi ‘Cuda over a second and a half faster than the GTO down the strip. With its light weight and massive performance, it’s simply no contest for the Pontiac at this stage.





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In May 2024, we released Part I of this series, in which we discussed agentic AI as an emerging technology enabling a new generation of AI-based hardware devices and software tools that can take actions on behalf of users. It turned out we were early – very early – to the discussion, with several months elapsing before agentic AI became as widely known and discussed as it is today. In this Part II, we return to the topic to explore legal issues concerning user liability for agentic AI-assisted transactions and open questions about existing legal frameworks’ applicability to the new generation of AI-assisted transactions.

Background: Snapshot of the Current State of “Agents”[1]

“Intelligent” electronic assistants are not new—the original generation, such as Amazon’s Alexa, have been offering narrow capabilities for specific tasks for more than a decade. However, as OpenAI’s CEO Sam Altman commented in May 2024, an advanced AI assistant or “super-competent colleague” could be the killer app of the future. Later, Altman noted during a Reddit AMA session: “We will have better and better models. But I think the thing that will feel like the next giant breakthrough will be agents.” A McKinsey report on AI agents echoes this sentiment: “The technology is moving from thought to action.” Agentic AI represents not only a technological evolution, but also a potential means to further spread (and monetize) AI technology beyond its current uses by consumers and businesses. Major AI developers and others have already embraced this shift, announcing initiatives in the agentic AI space. For example:  

  • Anthropic announced an updated frontier AI model in public beta capable of interacting with and using computers like human users;
  • Google unveiled Gemini 2.0, its new AI model for the agentic era, alongside Project Mariner, a prototype leveraging Gemini 2.0 to perform tasks via an experimental Chrome browser extension (while keeping a “human in the loop”);
  • OpenAI launched a “research preview” of Operator, an AI tool that can interface with computers on users’ behalf, and launched beta feature “Tasks” in ChatGPT to facilitate ongoing or future task management beyond merely responding to real time prompts;
  • LexisNexis announced the availability of “Protégé,” a personalized AI assistant with agentic AI capabilities;
  • Perplexity recently rolled out “Shop Like a Pro,” an AI-powered shopping recommendation and buying feature that allows Perplexity Pro users to research products and, for those merchants whose sites are integrated with the tool, purchase items directly on Perplexity; and
  • Amazon announced Alexa+, a new generation of Alexa that has agentic capabilities, including enabling Alexa to navigate the internet and execute tasks, as well as Amazon Nova Act, an AI model designed to perform actions within a web browser.

Beyond these examples, other startups and established tech companies are also developing AI “agents” in this country and overseas (including the invite-only release of Manus AI by Butterfly Effect, an AI developer in China). As a recent Microsoft piece speculates, the generative AI future may involve a “new ecosystem or marketplace of agents,” akin to the current smartphone app ecosystem.  Although early agentic AI device releases have received mixed reviews and seem to still have much unrealized potential, they demonstrate the capability of such devices to execute multistep actions in response to natural language instructions.

Like prior technological revolutions—personal computers in the 1980s, e-commerce in the 1990s and smartphones in the 2000s—the emergence of agentic AI technology challenges existing legal frameworks. Let’s take a look at some of those issues – starting with basic questions about contract law.

Note: This discussion addresses general legal issues with respect to hypothetical agentic AI devices or software tools/apps that have significant autonomy. The examples provided are illustrative and do not reflect any specific AI tool’s capabilities.

Automated Transactions and Electronic Agents

Electronic Signatures Statutory Law Overview

A foundational legal question is whether transactions initiated and executed by an AI tool on behalf of a user are enforceable.  Despite the newness of agentic AI, the legal underpinnings of electronic transactions are well-established. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”), which has been adopted by every state and the District of Columbia (except New York, as noted below), the federal E-SIGN Act, and the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), serve as the legal framework for the use of electronic signatures and records, ensuring their validity and enforceability in interstate commerce. The fundamental provisions of UETA are Sections 7(a)-(b), which provide: “(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; (b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.” 

UETA is technology-neutral and “applies only to transactions between parties each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means” (allowing the parties to choose the technology they desire). In the typical e-commerce transaction, a human user selects products or services for purchase and proceeds to checkout, which culminates in the user clicking “I Agree” or “Purchase.”  This click—while not a “signature” in the traditional sense of the word—may be effective as an electronic signature, affirming the user’s agreement to the transaction and to any accompanying terms, assuming the requisite contractual principles of notice and assent have been met.

At the federal level, the E-SIGN Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031) (“E-SIGN”) establishes the same basic tenets regarding electronic signatures in interstate commerce and contains a reverse preemption provision, generally allowing states that have passed UETA to have UETA take precedence over E-SIGN.  If a state does not adopt UETA but enacts another law regarding electronic signatures, its alternative law will preempt E-SIGN only if the alternative law specifies procedures or requirements consistent with E-SIGN, among other things.

However, while UETA has been adopted by 49 states and the District of Columbia, it has not been enacted in New York. Instead, New York has its own electronic signature law, the Electronic Signature Records Act (“ESRA”) (N.Y. State Tech. Law § 301 et seq.). ESRA generally provides that “An electronic record shall have the same force and effect as those records not produced by electronic means.” According to New York’s Office of Information Technology Services, which oversees ESRA, “the definition of ‘electronic signature’ in ESRA § 302(3) conforms to the definition found in the E-SIGN Act.” Thus, as one New York state appellate court stated, “E-SIGN’s requirement that an electronically memorialized and subscribed contract be given the same legal effect as a contract memorialized and subscribed on paper…is part of New York law, whether or not the transaction at issue is a matter ‘in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.’”[2] 

Given US states’ wide adoption of UETA model statute, with minor variations, this post will principally rely on its provisions in analyzing certain contractual questions with respect to AI agents, particularly given that E-SIGN and UETA work toward similar aims in establishing the legal validity of electronic signatures and records and because E-SIGN expressly permits states to supersede the federal act by enacting UETA.  As for New York’s ESRA, courts have already noted that the New York legislature incorporated the substantive terms of E-SIGN into New York law, thus suggesting that ESRA is generally harmonious with the other laws’ purpose to ensure that electronic signatures and records have the same force and effect as traditional signatures.  

Electronic “Agents” under the Law

Beyond affirming the enforceability of electronic signatures and transactions where the parties have agreed to transact with one another electronically, Section 2(2) of UETA also contemplates “automated transactions,” defined as those “conducted or performed, in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts or records of one or both parties are not reviewed by an individual.” Central to such a transaction is an “electronic agent,” which Section 2(6) of UETA defines as “a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.” Under UETA, in an automated transaction, a contract may be formed by the interaction of “electronic agents” of the parties or by an “electronic agent” and an individual. E-SIGN similarly contemplates “electronic agents,” and states: “A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the action of one or more electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.”[3] Under both of these definitions, agentic AI tools—which are increasingly able to initiate actions and respond to records and performances on behalf of users—arguably qualify as “electronic agents” and thus can form enforceable contracts under existing law.[4]

AI Tools and E-Commerce Transactions

Given this existing body of statutory law enabling electronic signatures, from a practical perspective this may be the end of the analysis for most e-commerce transactions. If I tell an AI tool to buy me a certain product and it does so, then the product’s vendor, the tool’s provider and I might assume—with the support of UETA, E-SIGN, the UCC, and New York’s ESRA—that the vendor and I (via the tool) have formed a binding agreement for the sale and purchase of the good, and that will be the end of it unless a dispute arises about the good or the payment (e.g., the product is damaged or defective, or my credit card is declined), in which case the AI tool isn’t really relevant.

But what if the transaction does not go as planned for reasons related to the AI tool? Consider the following scenarios:

  • Misunderstood Prompts: The tool misinterprets a prompt that would be clear to a human but is confusing to its model (e.g., the user’s prompt states, “Buy two boxes of 101 Dalmatians Premium dog food,” and the AI tool orders 101 two-packs of dog food marketed for Dalmatians).
  • AI Hallucinations: The user asks for something the tool cannot provide or does not understand, triggering a hallucination in the model with unintended consequences (e.g., the user asks the model to buy stock in a company that is not public, so the model hallucinates a ticker symbol and buys stock in whatever real company that symbol corresponds to).
  • Violation of Limits: The tool exceeds a pre-determined budget or financial parameter set by the user (e.g., the user’s prompt states, “Buy a pair of running shoes under $100” and the AI tool purchases shoes from the UK for £250, exceeding the user’s limit).
  • Misinterpretation of User Preference: The tool misinterprets a prompt due to lack of context or misunderstanding of user preferences (e.g., the user’s prompt states, “Book a hotel room in New York City for my conference,” intending to stay near the event location in lower Manhattan, and the AI tool books a room in Queens because it prioritizes price over proximity without clarifying the user’s preference).

Disputes like these begin with a conflict between the user and a vendor—the AI tool may have been effective to create a contract between the user and the vendor, and the user may then have legal responsibility for that contract.  But the user may then seek indemnity or similar rights against the developer of the AI tool.

Of course, most developers will try to avoid these situations by requiring user approvals before purchases are finalized (i.e., “human in the loop”). But as desire for efficiency and speed increases (and AI tools become more autonomous and familiar with their users), these inbuilt protections could start to wither away, and users that grow accustomed to their tool might find themselves approving transactions without vetting them carefully. This could lead to scenarios like the above, where the user might seek to void a transaction or, if that fails, even try to avoid liability for it by seeking to shift his or her responsibility to the AI tool’s developer.[5] Could this ever work? Who is responsible for unintended liabilities related to transactions completed by an agentic AI tool?

Sources of Law Governing AI Transactions

AI Developer Terms of Service

As stated in UETA’s Prefatory Note, the purpose of UETA is “to remove barriers to electronic commerce by validating and effectuating electronic records and signatures.” Yet, the Note cautions, “It is NOT a general contracting statute – the substantive rules of contracts remain unaffected by UETA.”  E-SIGN contains a similar disclaimer in the statute, limiting its reach to statutes that require contracts or other records be written, signed, or in non-electronic form (15 U.S.C. §7001(b)(2)). In short, UETA, E-SIGN, and the similar UCC provisions do not provide contract law rules on how to form an agreement or the enforceability of the terms of any agreement that has been formed.

Thus, in the event of a dispute, terms of service governing agentic AI tools will likely be the primary source to which courts will look to assess how liability might be allocated. As we noted in Part I of this post, early-generation agentic AI hardware devices generally include terms that not only disclaim responsibility for the actions of their products or the accuracy of their outputs, but also seek indemnification against claims arising from their use. Thus, absent any express customer-favorable indemnities, warranties or other contractual provisions, users might generally bear the legal risk, barring specific legal doctrines or consumer protection laws prohibiting disclaimers or restrictions of certain claims.[6]

But what if the terms of service are nonexistent, don’t cover the scenario, or—more likely—are unenforceable? Unenforceable terms for online products and services are not uncommon, for reasons ranging from “browsewrap” being too hidden, to specific provisions being unconscionable. What legal doctrines would control during such a scenario?

The Backstop: User Liability under UETA and E-SIGN

Where would the parties stand without the developer’s terms? E-SIGN allows for the effectiveness of actions by “electronic agents” “so long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.” This provision seems to bring the issue back to the terms of service governing a transaction or general principles of contract law. But again, what if the terms of service are nonexistent or don’t cover a particular scenario, such as those listed above. As it did with the threshold question of whether AI tools could form contracts in the first place, UETA appears to offer a position here that could be an attractive starting place for a court. Moreover, in the absence of express language under New York’s ESRA, a New York court might apply E-SIGN (which contains an “electronic agent” provision) or else find insight as well by looking at UETA and its commentary and body of precedent if the court isn’t able to find on-point binding authority, which wouldn’t be a surprise, considering that we are talking about technology-driven scenarios that haven’t been possible until very recently.

UETA generally attributes responsibility to users of “electronic agents”, with the prefatory note explicitly stating that the actions of electronic agents “programmed and used by people will bind the user of the machine.” Section 14 of UETA (titled “Automated Transaction”) reinforces this principle, noting that a contract can be formed through the interaction of “electronic agents” “even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agreements.” Accordingly, when automated tools such as agentic AI systems facilitate transactions between parties who knowingly consent to conduct business electronically, UETA seems to suggest that responsibility defaults to the users—the persons who most immediately directed or initiated their AI tool’s actions. This reasoning treats the AI as a user’s tool, consistent with the other UETA Comments (e.g., “contracts can be formed by machines functioning as electronic agents for parties to a transaction”).

However, different facts or technologies could lead to alternative interpretations, and ambiguities remain. For example, Comment 1 to UETA Section 14 asserts that the lack of human intent at the time of contract formation does not negate enforceability in contracts “formed by machines functioning as electronic agents for parties to a transaction” and that “when machines are involved, the requisite intention flows from the programming and use of the machine” (emphasis added).

This explanatory text has a couple of issues. First, it is unclear about what constitutes “programming” and seems to presume that the human intention at the programming step (whatever that may be) is more-or-less the same as the human intention at the use step[7], but this may not always be the case with AI tools. For example, it is conceivable that an AI tool could be programmed by its developer to put the developer’s interests above the users’, for example by making purchases from a particular preferred e-commerce partner even if that vendor’s offerings are not the best value for the end user. This concept may not be so far-fetched, as existing GenAI developers have entered into content licensing deals with online publishers to obtain the right for their chatbots to generate outputs or feature licensed content, with links to such sources. Of course, there is a difference between a chatbot offering links to relevant licensed news sources that are accurate (but not displaying appropriate content from other publishers) versus an agentic chatbot entering into unintended transactions or spending the user’s funds in unwanted ways. This discrepancy in intention alignment might not be enough to allow the user to shift liability for a transaction from a user to a programmer, but it is not hard to see how larger misalignments might lead to thornier questions, particularly in the event of litigation when a court might scrutinize the enforceability of an AI vendor’s terms (under the unconscionability doctrine, for example). 

Second, UETA does not contemplate the possibility that the AI tool might have enough autonomy and capability that some of its actions might be properly characterized as the result of its own intent. Looking at UETA’s definition of “electronic agent,” the commentary notes that “As a general rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of that tool since the tool has no independent volition of its own.” But as we know, technology has advanced in the last few decades and depending on the tool, an autonomous AI tool might one day have much independent volition (and further UETA commentary admits the possibility of a future with more autonomous electronic agents). Indeed, modern AI researchers have been contemplating this possibility even before rapid technological progress began with ChatGPT.

Still, Section 10 of UETA may be relevant to some of the scenarios from our bulleted selection of AI tool mishaps listed above, including misunderstood prompts or AI hallucinations. UETA Section 10 (titled “Effect of Change or Error”) outlines the possible actions a party may take when discovering human or machine errors or when “a change or error in an electronic record occurs in a transmission between parties to a transaction.” The remedies outlined in UETA depend on the circumstances of the transaction and whether the parties have agreed to certain security procedures to catch errors (e.g., a “human in the loop” confirming an AI-completed transaction) or whether the transaction involves an individual and a machine.[8]  In this way, the guardrails integrated into a particular AI tool or by the parties themselves play a role in the liability calculus. The section concludes by stating that if none of UETA’s error provisions apply, then applicable law governs, which might include the terms of the parties’ contract and the law of mistake, unconscionability and good faith and fair dealing.

* * *

Thus, along an uncertain path we circle back to where we started: the terms of the transaction and general contract law principles and protections. However, not all roads lead to contract law. In our next installment in this series, we will explore the next logical source of potential guidance on AI tool liability questions: agency law.  Decades of established law may now be challenged by a new sort of “agent” in the form of agentic AI…and a new AI-related lawsuit foreshadows the issues to come.


[1] In keeping with common practice in the artificial intelligence industry, this article refers to AI tools that are capable of taking actions on behalf of users as “agents” (in contrast to more traditional AI tools that can produce content but not take actions). However, note that the use of this term is not intended to imply that these tools are “agents” under agency law.

[2] In addition, the UCC has provisions consistent with UETA and E-SIGN providing for the use of electronic records and electronic signatures for transactions subject to the UCC. The UCC does not require the agreement of the parties to use electronic records and electronic signatures, as UETA and E-SIGN do.

[3] Under E-SIGN, “electronic agent” means “a computer program or an electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part without review or action by an individual at the time of the action or response.”

[4] It should be noted that New York’s ESRA does not expressly provide for the use of “electronic agents,” yet does not prohibit them either.  Reading through ESRA and the ESRA regulation, the spirit of the law could be construed as forward-looking and seems to suggest that it supports the use of automated systems and electronic means to create legally binding agreements between willing parties. Looking to New York precedent, one could also argue that E-SIGN, which contains provisions about the use of “electronic agents”, might also be applicable in certain circumstances to fill the “electronic agent” gap in ESRA. For example, the ESRA regulations (9 CRR-NY § 540.1) state: “New technologies are frequently being introduced. The intent of this Part is to be flexible enough to embrace future technologies that comply with ESRA and all other applicable statutes and regulations.”  On the other side, one could argue that certain issues surrounding “electronic agents” are perhaps more unsettled in New York.  Still, New York courts have found ESRA consistent with E-SIGN.  

[5] Since AI tools are not legal persons, they could not be liable themselves (unlike, for example, a rogue human agent could be in some situations). We will explore agency law questions in Part III.

[6] Once agentic AI technology matures, it is possible that certain user-friendly contractual standards might emerge as market participants compete in the space. For example, as we wrote about in a prior post, in 2023 major GenAI providers rolled out indemnifications to protect their users from third-party claims of intellectual property infringement arising from GenAI outputs, subject to certain carve-outs.

[7] The electronic “agents” in place at the time of UETA’s passage might have included basic e-commerce tools or EDI (Electronic Data Interchange), which is used by businesses to exchange standardized documents, such as purchase orders, electronically between trading partners, replacing traditional methods like paper, fax, mail or telephone. Electronic tools are generally designed to explicitly perform according to the user’s intentions (e.g., clicking on an icon will add this item to a website shopping cart or send this invoice to the customer) and UETA, Section 10, contains provisions governing when an inadvertent or electronic error occurs (as opposed to an abrogation of the user’s wishes).

[8] For example, UETA Section 10 states that if a change or error occurs in an electronic record during transmission between parties to a transaction, the party who followed an agreed-upon security procedure to detect such changes can avoid the effect of the error, if the other party who didn’t follow the procedure would have detected the change had they complied with the security measure; this essentially places responsibility on the party who failed to use the agreed-upon security protocol to verify the electronic record’s integrity.

Comments to UETA Section 10 further explain the context of this section: “The section covers both changes and errors. For example, if Buyer sends a message to Seller ordering 100 widgets, but Buyer’s information processing system changes the order to 1000 widgets, a “change” has occurred between what Buyer transmitted and what Seller received. If on the other hand, Buyer typed in 1000 intending to order only 100, but sent the message before noting the mistake, an error would have occurred which would also be covered by this section.”  In the situation where a human makes a mistake when dealing with an electronic agent, the commentary explains that “when an individual makes an error while dealing with the electronic agent of the other party, it may not be possible to correct the error before the other party has shipped or taken other action in reliance on the erroneous record.”



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